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After more than a century, the vendetta is back in Western Europe. In the quiet small Dutch towns of Zevenaar and Velp, two extended families of Kurds are responsible for five deaths in a row. Immigrant families from Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey, they are related to each other. The first death in 1994 appears to have been a simple case of murder: the owner of a pub they jointly ran shot his nephew in the back in the course of a business disagreement. However, five years later and three months after the offender from Zevenaar was released from prison, he in turn was murdered. To this very day, the family in Velp claim they did not hire a hit man to do the job, but at the Kurdish coffee shop, the old men know better: Velp finally took vengeance. Shortly after the second murder, the father from Velp went on holiday to Turkey, where he was murdered. On 8 April 2000 - the larger extended family from Velp had come for a commemoration ceremony - there was a confrontation between the two families in Zevenaar. Two of the relatives from Velp were riddled with bullets, another two wounded, as was one from Zevenaar, probably by a bullet fired by his own group. The relatives from Velp say they didn’t even have guns, but the ones from Zevenaar definitely came prepared. To be able to defend themselves, they say, they were armed with pistols and even a Kalashnikov.
	What in the world are the Dutch Police and justice Departments supposed to do about these unusual crimes? There is no time to spare, because there are certain to be new victims before long. In addition to the people from the local Turkish community who know what is going on, anthropological experts can predict who the next victim is likely to be just by doing some genealogical backtracking. Both families nonetheless state it is not a traditional feud. The folks from Velp are eager to get past archaic customs such as honour and blood vengeance and the ones from Zevenaar say they have no choice but to adequately protect themselves.
Essentially there is little a criminal court judge in the Netherlands can do. The criminal justice system only seems to intensify the conflict. In 2002 the Arnhem Court of Appeals unexpectedly released the gunmen from Zevenaar. The Court “considered it plausible that a vendetta situation can cause so much fear that self-defence is justified.” Ever since, tension between the two families has been on the rise. They meet every day at school, on the market, at the hospital, at the clubs where the youths go. There can be a new victim any day now. The inadequacy of the criminal justice system is painfully obvious. Criminal law might serve any number of functions (retribution, crime prevention, rehabilitation), but settling disputes or dealing with vendettas is not one of them. 
	The two families are taking matters into their own hands and looking for the kind of solution they are familiar with from the old country and hope will be effective in new circumstances. Peace can be established by restoring the balance. The family that committed the last murder has to offer compensation, for example by allowing one of their girls to marry an older man from the other family. But it won’t be much help in Europe nowadays, since the families are so assimilated it is not likely any of the young daughters would be willing to cooperate. Peace can also be established by having one family give the other a plot of land or pay a substantial sum of money. However, the families are so well integrated they are aware the authorities implement ethnic minority policy by granting subsidies. Won’t the Mayor of Zevenaar pay fifty thousand dollars to appease the wrath of the family in Velp? It might be a short-term solution, but considering the precedent it would be creating, the town authorities can hardly be expected to consider it an attractive option. It wouldn’t satisfy the aggrieved party either, since it is the enemy they want to see suffer, not the town authorities. Lastly, efforts can be made to have a third party try and mediate. The family in Velp initially sought the help of the Kurd Parliament-in-exile in Brussels, but to no avail. The politicians listened to their story, but their attention was distracted at the time by the recent arrest of their political leader Öcelan, who was being put on trial in Turkey.
On 9 March 2001 a letter was sent to the Queen of the Netherlands. Couldn’t she “find some influential people who could mediate between the two families in this conflict”? The letter was passed on to the Minister of Justice, who did indeed find a “wise man” who would fit the bill. Each of the parties had someone in mind like what they knew back home in Turkey as the aga - a local despot who would use his own armed men if necessary to get people to show the proper respect. He was there but in keeping with Dutch custom he was unarmed. One of the two extended families conceded and allowed the Dutch authorities to arrange for them to move. It meant resettlement for more than twenty nuclear families. Before the local authorities grant final permission, years will have gone by. And how many more deaths will that entail?

Criminal cases like this attract a great deal of European media attention. They are the ones that stand out in the endless list of daily problems generated by the increasing ethnic and cultural pluriformity of modern society. Like the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and other European countries have experienced large-scale immigration since World War Two. It was quite some time before their authorities were willing to face the fact that they had become immigration countries, but they now do. Today more than half the pupils at the schools in many European metropolises are from immigrant families. Institutions in the fields of health care, education and business have to deal with a growing diversity of patients, pupils and customers. The same holds true for the administration of justice. Although not many officials feel free to speak about it openly, we believe every aspect of the criminal justice apparatus in all the countries of Western Europe is under pressure to work towards ethnic diversification. They also look for alternatives to criminal law to solve problems of deviant behavior.
Criminal court judges may well have been extremely hesitant to allow cultural considerations to play a role in their decisions. There are strict norms to criminal justice procedures and judges attribute a great deal of significance to the principle of equality in special cases that put them in the spotlight. But in the investigation and prosecution stage of criminal justice proceedings as well as the punishment stage, it is already quite common to take the defendants’ ethnic background  into consideration. So far, the only European country where legal decisions based on cultural diversity have been openly discussed (Poulter 1998) and where the Judicial Studies Board made an Equal Treatment Bench Book (1999) available as an aid to judges is Great Britain. 
In the Netherlands, we have researched ethnic diversification in the treatment of offenders (Bovenkerk, Komen and Yesilgöz, 2003). In fact, a great deal of experimentation is going on. The boards of directors of the institutions and departments involved have discretionary competence to take whatever measures they deem effective and respectful to the culture of their clients. This may not be accepted in theory, but in actual practice taking culture into consideration has long been part and parcel of the proceedings. Let us give one example of cultural exceptions of this kind at each of two stages in the criminal justice chain.
* A criminal case in Holland can be closed by the prosecutor who agrees with an alternative punishment if the offence is not all too severe. This keeps youths from having to go through a damaging procedure in the criminal justice system. One precondition for a HALT - i.e. alternative -  settlement is that a confession has been signed. After all, what sense would it make to be punished at all for something you have not done? The staff at the HALT office is surprised at how few ethnic minority youths they see there, even though they do clearly play a major role in the crime figures. Selectivity in the investigation process? Discrimination? The police have a different explanation. They are clearly under the impression that ethnic minority youths often fail to meet the confession criterion (Wartna, Beijers and Essers 1999). It is not so much that they refuse to confess because it is not clear they committed the crime (the evidence is often technically sufficient and sometimes they were even caught in the act). The problem is that they are following the cultural precept not to admit having engaged in such a shameful act. The solution opted for by the Public Prosecutor is a pragmatic case for exemption. In these cases the confession is not required: “Youths who (have to) plead not guilty for reasons of religious faith or cultural background” are now nonetheless eligible for an alternative settlement.
* Repetitive offences are extremely common among juvenile delinquents of Moroccan descent and since it would be worth while to at least examine whether Moroccan social workers do better with them than Dutch ones, an experiment was conducted in Amsterdam in 1993 with a separate penal institution exclusively for Moroccan youths. In Amal (the Moroccan word for hope), Moroccan social workers treat their clients in keeping with “Moroccan norms, values, and customs.” The experiment failed after the youths complained about the personnel beating them.

May or should the ethnic background of criminal offenders play a role in all the steps of criminal justice proceedings? The trend towards ethnic pluriformity in the criminal justice system calls to mind six basic related questions. The first four are of an empirical criminological nature and pertain to the new multicultural societies in Europe. (1) Do ethnic minorities really each have their own crime patterns? (2) Are these crime patterns based on cultural differences? If so, (3) Is there also evidence of differences in their ideas on crime and punishment? (4) To what extent do administrators of criminal justice in the broad sense (from policemen to prison guards) now already give in to the pressure generated by these differences and the temptation to treat ethnic minorities differently? (5) What solutions have they come up with? The last question is of a normative nature. It pertains to multiculturalism as a political ideology rather than multiculturality as an empirical fact. (6) Is the introduction of legal pluralism along ethnic lines desirable? Let us address these questions in the same sequence. Although many of our examples are taken from the Netherlands, which we know best and where for reasons we note below, more experimenting has been going on than in other countries, the issues addressed should be relevant for all modern industrialized immigration countries.

1. Ethnic crime patterns 

The issue of immigrant and ethnic minority crime, particularly among the second generation, has been noted all across Western Europe (Tonry 1997, Haen-Marshall 1997). Multifarious studies have been conducted. There is however still little consensus on how to define the problem. Are relatively high crime rates the result of social disadvantage? Are they attributable to the dislocation accompanying the migration process? Do they result from discrimination by the criminal law system? To what degree does it have to do with culture?  
In most European countries it is hard to answer these questions, since analyzing ethnic specificity in crime is taboo. As each country has its own historical discourse on social problems, each one has its own blind spots of political correctness. In Germany the whole subject of ethnic minority crime is a very emotional matter. Criminologists are hesitant to draw what might be construed as a link to the Third Reich. They object to anyone separately studying the problem of Ausländer​kriminalität and argue that the offenders (the second generation) were born in Germany and no such distinction should be drawn (Ottersbach and Trautmann 1999). In the United Kingdom the subject has been off limits ever since the aftermath of the London police blunders in the Lawrence case. The black schoolboy Stephen Lawrence was stabbed to death at a bus stop by white racists in 1993, but the police persisted in looking for the killers in immigrant circles. From the moment when the committee led by Member of Parliament Macpherson condemned the police shortcomings in 1999, the Chiefs of Police in London and Manchester have been openly discussing whether racism is just common among individual police officers, or whether the police force as a whole exhibits institutional racism. It is difficult to discuss the problem of  ethnic minority crime in public in Great Britain, and the predominant discourse in criminology pertains to racism among the police and the public (Bowling 1998). In 1999 The Belgian Minister of Justice instructed criminologist Marion van San to conduct a study on crime among ethnic minority youths there. The study was immediately turned into a political issue and was said to promote the interests of the Vlaams Blok, an extreme right-wing party on the rise at the time. Even before any of her Belgian colleagues had an inkling of what her study was to entail, they stated in public that ethnicity simply could not be used as explanation because there was too much of a danger of exoticizing and essentializing ethnicity and culture. The monograph on the subject that was published two years later (Van San and Leerkes 2001) is still controversial in Belgium. The question was skirted in another way in France. The French conception of citizenship assumes that each citizen has an individual relationship with the state, and separate ethnic groups simply do not exist. If there are no separate ethnic groups, obviously there cannot be any such thing as specific ethnic crime problems. The problems that undeniably play a role in the banlieus of Paris, Marseilles and other large cities are not defined as problems of second-generation immigrants, but as problems of slums. 
In the Netherlands this ethnic taboo in criminology (Karmen 1980) was largely dealt with in the debate following the 1988 leaking of a City of Amsterdam report on Moroccan crime and the dissertation by Marianne Junger in 1990 showing that Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese youths from the same socio-economic class as Dutch peers really do exhibit far more criminal conduct. After that, interest in the subject mushroomed. The study of ethnic minority crime in the Netherlands is extensive and has generated hundreds of titles. Most of the reports and books are in Dutch and it will be  a while before this production has been recognized.​[1]​ It is not quite clear why recognition of the problem came so easily. Here we find a possible clue to the Dutch receptiveness of the idea that culture might play a role.​[2]​ The Dutch tradition of accepting cultural differences and the political agreement on non-intervention in religious group cultures - Roman Catholics and various Protestant denominations and the secular segment of the population - was long recognized as the frame of reference in which the Dutch interpret their “race relations” (Bagley 1973 on The Dutch Plural Society). It explains why the Dutch perceive the immigration issue as an ethnic and cultural problem. This may to some degree account for possible selectivity in how the Police and Justice Departments produce such high ethnic minority crime rates as well as the unusual interest on the part of Dutch criminologists and politicians.
Another explanation would imply that ethnic minority crime rates are in fact noticeably higher in the Netherlands than elsewhere. Koopmans (2003) ventures into the difficult problem of comparative criminology and is the first to contrast the incarceration rates of minorities in nine European countries. He calculates the degree of over-representation of foreign-born inmates or ethnic or racial minorities if any such data exists by comparing theit percentage of the prison population to their percentage in the total population.​[3]​ It is surprising to see how large the international variation is. Great Britain has the lowest rate of over-representation: 2.4 (racial minorities constituting somewhat over 6% of the total population account for 18 % of the inmate population), Germany’s rate is 4, France’s 4.1, Belgium’s 4.2 and the Netherlands is highest with 6.3. 

2. Ethnic minority crime and culture

The question is of course what is meant in this context by culture or by related concepts such as tradition, orientation or ethnicity. The vendetta example that opens this chapter illustrates how the idea of culture is contested in the courtroom. Most of the ethnographic studies just mentioned adhere to a culturalist definition of the problem and an essentialist conception of ethnicity. Culture is viewed as a set of norms, values and behavioural precepts imported from some distant land. So black youths from Suriname reproduce the hustling culture of Paramaribo, Moroccans bring in an attitude of mutual distrust from the Rif mountain region, criminal Antilleans stab each other with much the same knives they used in the Curacao ghetto and immigrants from Turkey follow the honour rules from back home down to every last detail. An independent and compelling force towards crime and deviance is attributed to the cultures of the countries of origin. If immigrants or their progeny refer to their tradition in these ethnographies, it is as if they have a pure source of culture in their native country. 
According to another and in many ways diametrically opposed constructivist view however, culture is not a given, it is not a thing that shapes human conduct outside the individuals themselves. Instead it should be seen as an analytical notion that constitutes an abstract version of their behaviour and ideas (Baumann 1996: 11). In addition, culture should be considered as the outcome of the process in which people give meaning to their world, and the formation of ethnic groups is a process that develops by way of collective identification (Verkuyten 1997). The formation of ethnic groups is frequently accompanied by drawing ethnic borders and cultivating or even inventing traditions. Conceived in this way, culture and ethnicity are in themselves qualities that require explanation, and not fixed givens of traditions that provide an explanation for whatever phenomena are under examination such as special forms of crime. 
The implication of this view is that ethnically specific crime is in itself also the result of a social construction and the manipulation of ideas and practices. It emerges within a certain social context and in interaction with the environment. Criminals use their culture creatively and manipulate it to get what they want. When they refer to laws or legal conceptions in the countries they come from, they might well have long since ceased to exist, if they ever existed at all. In our own research in the relatively new tradition of cultural criminology as it is conducted at the Willem Pompe Criminology Research Institute of the University of Utrecht, researchers constantly discover examples of manipulation of culture. Coppes, De Groot and Sheerazi (1997) describe young Moroccan offenders who convince the police they are going to be beaten so viciously by their father or older brother that they ought to let them go without informing their family. Zaitch (2002) writes an inside story of cocaine traffickers operating in Holland and his treatment of cultural explanations for crime are more subtle and embedded in a framework of interpretation that is basically economic. He notes that drug dealers strategically refer to the Colombian cartels in order to get the upper hand. Bovenkerk, Siegel and Zaitch (2002) describe the manipulation of criminal reputations by Columbian cocaine dealers, Nigerian prostitutes, Russian mafiosi, Turkish heroin dealers and former Yugoslav bodyguards in the Dutch underworld. The administrators of criminal justice faced with ethnic minority criminals come up against people who make this kind of strategic use of their culture. 

“Cultural offenses” or “culturally motivated crimes”  (Van Broeck 2001) constitute an intriguing variation of the ethnicity and crime nexus. In keeping with the reasoning of Thorsten Sellin in 1938, crime may result from ethnic minorities following their own conduct norms and violating the law of their new homeland. The most well-known serious crime incidents pertain to avenging blood and honour, kidnapping and abducting, violence as sanction for violating exogamy rules, offences under the influence of magic, the circumcision of girls, funeral rituals and any number of forms of political crime and corruption. The offenders present themselves to the judge as people acting in accordance with their political or religious convictions and they will accept all the consequences. In the eyes of the parties involved, the customs are not viewed as being against the law, in fact if they did not adhere to them they would endanger their position in their own  community and perhaps even run the risk of being ostracized. These customs date back to before the time when state law was introduced in their home country and are still more or less accepted or completely permitted by the authorities in various countries or regions. There are numerous examples of criminal justice systems where under certain circumstances, cultural exceptions are permitted or where a certain extent of leniency is accepted as a norm. In Iran for example, people participating in a blood feud as a matter of honour are not prosecuted, and in Turkey people who have killed to defend their family honour might get away with only an eighth of the sentence for murder. The defendants and their lawyers do not hesitate to refer to the traditional rules if they think it will lead to more lenient treatment or a total acquittal. 
Culturally motivated offenses present an interesting problem for the criminologist and deserve ample theoretical consideration. If we look at our - ethnocentric - textbooks, cultural offences do not really fall under any of our definitions of crime. Despite the international variety, crime is always defined as undesirable deviant behaviour and usually there are victims. Cultural crimes, however, evoke a great deal of approval in certain communities and the individuals we might view as the victims do not necessarily define themselves as such. Criminologists examine social and psychological or biological conditions causing deviant behaviour. In culture-related crime the offences are committed by individuals who prevent deviance from happening or getting worse. In cases of honour vengeance, the perpetrator seems to have no other choice but to cleanse the sullied reputation of his family (usually involving gossip about the moral conduct of a daughter, sister or mother) and it is evident from his attitude in court that he feels no shame about what he has done. To him and his family, the legal proceedings that ensue are of secondary importance. The main thing is that they can once again hold their heads up in the community, and all they are interested in as far as the court is concerned is damage control. Gambian or Somalian girls who have been circumcised can now expect boys in their circles to want to marry them. Culture-related crime entails the kind of offence people feel obliged to commit because of their cultural background and the immense social and psychological pressure exerted on them by their friends or relatives. In fact they do not view it as a crime at all and want to commit the act for a sacred cause. 
Individuals who commit cultural offences do not fit our stereotypical profile of the criminal. Criminals are usually seen as young men from the poorer segments of society, usually unemployed, poorly educated if at all, with no family responsibilities and so forth. They are often repeat offenders, and the first offenders among them are likely to become repeat offenders in the future. Criminals take risks. If they are caught, there is a good chance they will be registered or punished. Their social position worsens as a result of being punished. This is why criminals use neutralization techniques or retrospective excuses for their behavior. However, culture-related crime is mainly committed or ordered by people who are socially strong and in positions of  command. 
As to their motivation, let us follow the reasoning of the criminal inspired by faith. Crime is a bad thing, so under normal conditions people make every effort at home, at school, at work and in their leisure time to stay away from it. If this proves impossible, people who have to break the rules find they have sinned in the eyes of God or Allah. He is the one who will punish them. The authorities are not however willing to wait, and have developed criminal law systems and take it upon themselves to arrest and punish criminals. The cultural offender simply has to bear the consequences, though the  state’s reaction is of secondary importance to him. 
Despite their universalist pretention, mainstream theories in criminology have little explanatory power in the field of cultural crime. Theories with the most evident shortcomings are (a) deterrence theory, which criminal law is founded upon,  Sutherlans’ (b) differential association theory or (c) Hirshi’s control paradigm. (a) People who commit a culture-related crime know in advance the authorities are going to address the matter and thus is not taken into consideration in their thinking. As a consequence, deterrence does not work. In the event of a family feud or vendetta, it can happen that someone is shot just as he comes out of the front gate of a prison after being released. (b) Offenders are not lured into crime by evil friends as differential association would have it, viewing the notion of culture-related crime as a good friends theory. They can have a decent life and nice friends and if they want to keep them, they have to restore the honour that has been taken away. At any rate, that is what their good friends expect them to do. As soon as the problem is solved, the offender goes back to his respectable life.  (c) Culture-related crime is mainly committed or ordered by people who are socially strong and not those with weak or severed ties with conventional society as social control theory would have it. The have a status in society, or at any rate with their friends and relatives. This status is diminished by their not committing a crime, and now has to be restored. 
It is true that cultural offences of this type are not so common and barely exert any influence on ethnic-specific crime rates, but every time they do occur they face criminal justice authorities with a fundamental problem. The courtroom gives the members of the group an opportunity to solicit respect for their ideas and might even serve as a possible basis for collective action.

3. Ethnic diversity in ideas on crime and punishment

In principle, the approach taken by the Police and Justice Departments and other agencies involved in the administration of criminal justice in the broadest sense of the term is based upon the assumption that all their measures affect ethnic minority offenders in much the same way as majority ones. To a certain extent, ideas about good and evil and what is a crime and what is not are universal (Van Dijk and Zvekic 1993), and the same holds true for how seriously certain crimes are viewed in various countries (Newman 1980). A general validity is attributed to the instrumental results of criminal justice, such as general prevention. In some cases and among some ethnic minorities, the state’s criminal justice system does not however have the intended effect and sometimes its conduct even proves to be counter-productive. 
In the first instance this can result from poor communication. The literature on the sociology of law is filled with illustrations of cultural misunderstandings. One example is set in New York, where new immigrants from Russia who are about to be fined for not stopping at a red light give the traffic cops some money, as is their wont. To their surprise they are arrested for attempted bribery (Ryan and Rush 1997: 150). The solution is interesting. The police are given a training course in cultural sensitivity and a special lecture on American police methods is organized for the Russians of Brighton Beach in Brooklyn. Another example is set in Detroit (Hamed and Moore 1999: 113). Immigrants from the Middle East  have a hard time comprehending the American system of plea bargaining. Even if the sentence is shorter than the one commonly given for the specific offence, how can they confess to a crime they have not committed? Or so the immigrants tend to reason, and they are not the only ones. A defence attorney comes up with a solution. In the presence of his client, he offers the prosecuting attorney a twenty-dollar bill, which of course is returned to him afterwards, just to show that the prosecuting attorney is willing to consider a compromise. The clients recognize and accept the process.
In the second instance, there really are differences in people’s legal conceptions and norms. If immigrants and their children rapidly assimilate, this issue of diversity in notions of crime and punishment only plays a role for a short time if at all. But it plays far more of a role if immigrants do not plan to stay for good or choose to preserve and advance their own cultures, and the continuing influx keeps them well informed on all the latest developments back home. Many modern governments implicitly acknowledge the immigrants’ wishes by adopting multiculturalism as a policy goal. Immigrant public participation agencies express their points of view on the national policy on criminal justice, and more specifically on the policy pertaining to their group. Ethnic minority elites speak out. One would expect a natural tendency in individual criminal cases to plead for cultural leniency. To our surprise, we find many instances of the opposite. Immigrant conceptions of criminal law include a more severe approach rather than shorter sentences. This follows from their general social critique on soft, Western society. A good example is the now famous case of gang rape in Sydney, Australia, that contributed to a heated debate on the links between ethnicity and crime. The 20-year-old second-generation Lebanese leader of the gang was sentenced to a prison sentence of no less than 55 years. Melbourne criminologist Arie Freiberg wrote in the Sunday Age of 18 August 2002 that this “extreme sentence is seen by members of the offender’s community as racist, and this may diminish rather than promote respect for the law.” Instead, leaders of the Lebanese community found (in the same issue of the newspaper) that the defendant should be put away for life! “If the rape had occurred in Lebanon, the offenders almost certainly would have been put to death.” 
It is certainly surprising to note that ethnic minority leaders in the Netherlands are so in favour of the further investigation of crime in their own communities. One might think these ethnic minority leaders have been made accessories by the Dutch authorities and this is the result of the typically Dutch ethnic minority policy. The parties note that they themselves, as experts by experience, are in a position to propose better interventions outside as well as inside the criminal justice system. In 1991 the Turkish Public Participation Agency published a booklet called Turkish Youths Between Immigration and Gangs, citing the role of Turkish gangs in the drug trade and requesting that the authorities implement an integral special approach focused on Turks. In 1994, the National Federation of Chinese Organizations in the Netherlands published a booklet called Characters in the Lowlands asking the authorities for help in dealing with extortion in their restaurant sector. In 1988, a Moroccan Youth Commission consisting of prominent members of the Moroccan community proposed a number of measures for combating Moroccan juvenile delinquency in Moving Confidently towards the Future Together. The Antillean community was mobilized by the Antillaian Co-Citizenship Advisory Commission in the Netherlands and in its report Nèt Loke Falta in December 2001, it demanded co-responsibility in dealing with the crime problem among Antillean youths. 

To what extent do various ethnic minorities really have their own ideas on crime and punishment? We can assume the first generation of immigrants largely adhere to the ideas that prevail in the country or region they come from.​[4]​ But does this still hold true for the second generation, who are the ones exhibiting high crime rates? Do they really consider themselves second-generation immigrants, or do they define themselves as first-generation Dutch, German or French? And what about the third generation? Are they totally assimilated, or do they still have their own points of view and their own attitudes? There is a certain extent of consensus on this point in the literature. Although values and norms are certainly shaped in part by the parents, there is a sizeable generation gap, particularly regarding ideas on crime and punishment. The parents were socialized in a different type of society and are only capable of preparing their children for the new land to a limited extent.  In a comparative historic study on this problem in the United States, Waters (1999) notes that the second generation is exposed to an unbalanced and inconsistent mixture of influences on their upbringing exerted by the family, the street, the school and the mass media. The multicultural society generates hybrid and multi-layered personalities and this is obvious from the attitude to crime and punishment. 
		In the Netherlands, Akkas (1999) is the first to have made an effort to research this point using group interviews with Turkish youths. The topic seems extremely conducive to socially desirable responses. In theory of course all the respondents are against violence, but if the researcher’s question pertains to them personally, then unlike their Dutch peers, they prove quite willing to ruthlessly avenge any offence to the honour of their family. Whatever punishment this might involve for them is of only secondary importance. This first research finding inspires us to further examine the relation between various interpretations of the concept of culture. Even though the constructivist idea of culture seems superior as to flexibility and agency, the deeper levels of the personality might contain some kind of ethnic core identity. Is there space for a combination of the two? Based on insights from the theory of critical realism, Bader (2001) reasons that the now points of view need not be mutually exclusive. In describing ethnic identity, it is possible to adjust a double focus by devoting attention to the static as well as the dynamic elements of culture. 

4. Multicultural criminal justice

Even if there is still no academically conclusive evidence that ethnic minorities each have their own ideas on crime on punishment, there is no dearth of complaints voiced by  criminal justice officials about how the usual approach does not work. They are not taken seriously by minorities because these expect a very different kind of behaviour from the police and courts. Dutch alternative sentencing does not have much of an effect on groups they feel have a totally different perception of punishment (Klooster, van Hoek and van ‘t Hoff 1999). 
		It is probably the police who have the greatest willingness to experiment. Police officers have been appointed as ‘intercultural intermediaries’ to improve the poor communication between delinquent youths and their parents. Special projects have been developed such as Talking to Moroccan Parents and special contact officials have been appointed to stimulate the communication with the local ethnic minority community. The Neighbourhood Fathers Project in West Amsterdam, entailing a kind of neighbourhood watch of Moroccans for Moroccans, has even gained international acclaim. The creativity is overwhelming. Police officers organize homework classes, athletic events, sailing weekends and survival expeditions in mountainous regions for ethnic minority youths. 
		There is little evidence though of this kind of  cultural experimentation in the course of the criminal proceedings themselves. In the courtroom, the Public Prosecutor does sometimes wonder whether to include the issue of ethnic background in his closing statement. He can formulate a relatively lengthy sentence as a warning to other members of the group. In one Dutch court case against the father of a Turkish youth ordered by him to commit a violent act of revenge to defend the honour of the family, the Public Prosecutor formulates a lengthy sentence. “As far as I am concerned, the message should be very clear. In our society, violent acts of revenge to defend the honour of the family are not tolerated.” Lawyers are faced with the question of whether or not to present the suspect’s culture as an extenuating circumstance. One disadvantage of doing so is that the defendant always has to confess to the offence. In older immigration countries, this problem has long been acknowledged. In the United States the cultural defence has even been somewhat diffidently developed, and the culture of members of ethnic minorities is one of the considerations that can work in their favour in criminal cases (Renteln 1995). The same holds true in Australia and Canada, although there it is primarily in relation to the special position and group rights of native peoples. The difficulty is always to translate cultural considerations that pertain by definition to a whole category of people into the Western criminal justice system, which is focused in principle on the individual, not the group. In essence, culture can never provide a valid excuse, though it should clearly play a role in how the judge evaluates the personal background of the accused. 
		The defence lawyer cannot use a cultural defence for his client in Europe, though he can invoke other grounds for exemption from criminal liability. Firstly, he can plead  that the defendant used force in self-defence. The social or internally perceived pressure is so great that the accused is unable to withstand it, as in the case of the vendetta at the beginning of this chapter. Secondly, lawyers can plead provocation. They can refer to severe aggravation in the event of a public offence to their client’s honour. Thirdly, the perpetrators of cultural offences can be declared insane so they are not held responsible if the judge fails to understand the nature of the act or if wishes to consider extenuating circumstances without explicitly citing the cultural background of the accused in the sentencing. We can expect cases of  insanity plea to increasingly occur in Europe, e.g. in crimes involving people possessed by demons. Fourthly, it is possible in principle to plead innocence in cases where members of ethnic minorities are not familiar with the law. This can for example be the case when they send money home via informal banking systems. People from countries without a banking infrastructure think all you need to do is go to a banker who calls a relative or some trusted person and tells him to give the money to the beneficiary. This can mean a violation of the law stipulating underground banking as a punishable act. This law has been formulated to combat organized crime or terrorism, but this form of informal banking is an everyday thing for people from some Third World countries.
		Judges tend to cling to the rules and generally hold their tongue. They are however facing a dilemma in that they want to consider the defendants’ sense of justice and sometimes do allow cultural background to play a role in their judgement. In the final sentencing, at most this can be found in the form of a covert allusion. Other officials in the criminal proceedings face the same dilemma. The forensic report to the court by psychiatrists, which is drawn up from a Western point of view, leads to bizarre problems when dealing with suspects from other cultures. Child Care and Protection Boards and Probation and After-care Councils, which also make recommendations, would prefer not to diversify but in their day-to-day practice they have no choice. This issue also plays a role in the last stage of the criminal justice chain, the enforcement of sentences. Clear efforts are made to take the matter of religious diversity into consideration (Moerings and Post 2003). Measures have been taken to respect religious precepts, there are opportunities to celebrate various religious holidays, which are not automatically included in the existing laws on compulsory labour, various types of meals are prepared, and convicts are permitted to receive religious guidance from their own clergymen. 
		For more than a decade, efforts have been made at all the country’s prisons and penitentiaries to cope with the issue of ethnic diversity. What is the right response? The conduct of the authorities should be understood by the suspects and their communities, it should be in keeping with their sense of justice and it should be effective in that it prevents recidivism. The theoretical question underlying these practical problems is: To what extent should society’s ethnic diversity be expressed in judicial diversity? The officials at all the various links in the criminal justice chain are faced with the same dilemmas: Should members of ethnic minorities be treated differently? Where are the boundaries of this special treatment? The principle of equality is deeply embedded in criminal law, and this principle is more crucial than anywhere else in matters of race (in Anglo-Saxon countries) and ethnic or national descent (in Continental Europe). The civil rights movement in the United States and the ethnic minority and anti-discrimination organizations in Europe all want the formal equality of procedures for minorities to really lead to material equality. According to ample research, there is still a long way to go before this goal is reached. The police in the United States definitely do discriminate in their investigation methods, Public Prosecutors get very tough when it comes to users of the black drug crack cocaine, judges are less lenient with black defendants, as is also clear from the disproportionately high percentage of blacks condemned to death  (Kennedy 1997). Inequality of this kind has also been revealed in studies conducted in Europe.
		Matters become even more complex if the social categories ethnic minorities belong to differ as regards a criterion relevant to the administration of criminal justice. The reasoning might then be that it is precisely the inequality in treatment that produces equality. In the United States, this culturally sensitive approach is supported by numerous studies in actual practice and included in police, criminal justice and social work training courses. Textbooks discuss “strategies for peacekeeping in a diverse society” (Shusta et al. 1995) and the “culturally sensitive treatment of minority crime victims” (Ogawa 1999). There is an abstract criterion for drawing distinctions that is relevant to the administration of criminal justice. Ethnic minorities can claim a right to special treatment on the grounds of their right to their own culture. Section 27 of the International Treaty on Civil and Political Rights guarantees respect for minorities and their culture. In the judicial system, the discrepancy between the two basic rights, equality and special treatment, can be resolved by making the law more complex, liberalizing regulations or applying the principle of discretionary powers. Any number of family law or religious questions can relatively easily be settled using these instruments because it is primarily private life that is entailed   and there are no serious consequences for the majority population. This also holds true as regards the social fields that are only weakly institutionalised. The expansion of the Burial and Cremation Act does not generate many problems, nor do days off from work or school on other groups’ religious holidays or greater ritual slaughter options. As regards other issues though, the ideas and customs of ethnic minorities differ too much from the existing legal rules; polygamy is prohibited and so is female circumcision, compulsory education requirements also apply to girls, supporting a fatwa such as the one against Salman Rushdie is unacceptable, and neither blood feuds nor abduction can be tolerated. General human rights pretty much demarcate the borderline (Poulter 1989, Foblets 2002).

6. Is ethnic pluralism in criminal law desirable?

Is it politically and socially desirable to admit elements of pluralism to the criminal law chain? There are arguments for and against doing so. The ones in favour derive from the political philosophy of multiculturalism. According to the multicultural line of reasoning, cultural diversity ought to be acknowledged and appreciated in modern, liberal democratic societies. The people maintain their relations with the government via the intermediary of the cultural community they are part of. This obliges the state to not only tolerate the cultural identity of individuals and groups, but to actively protect it (Kymlicka 1995). This not only holds true for the pleasing aspects of diversity, it holds true even more for the ideas and customs that tend to evoke irritation and disapproval. This category includes cultural offences generally committed within the group as well as ideas about how the community itself ought to prevent and combat crime. In the administration of criminal justice, taking the cultural background of defendants into consideration inevitably leads to a certain form of legal pluralism. 
		We have noted the most important instrumental argument in favour of a certain extent of pluralization in the criminal justice system: taking ethnic specificity into consideration can contribute towards the effectiveness of criminal law and other interventions and thus the reduction of crime. We do not know whether this specificity in the approach really helps. As far as we know, no evaluation studies are available on projects of this kind (what works?) that can withstand the test of academic criticism. 
		Another argument in favour of diversification is that it puts ethnic minorities in a better position to accurately see their own place in the criminal justice system, which gives it an extra element of legitimacy. Something should be said here to counter the obvious argument that taking the defendant’s cultural background into consideration works against the social integration of immigrants. Wouldn’t immigrants feel more at home in a society that acknowledges their culture and where their views are taken seriously than in a society where unconditional assimilation is required? There are ethnic minority parents who send their children back to their country of origin to get a decent - religious - education there. It is their way of protesting what they see as the sick Western mind set and getting their children away from its immorality. After a questionnaire survey, Veenman (1996) concludes that many Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands send their children home for a year, causing them to lag behind in the Dutch school system and on the Dutch labour market. 
		And now the arguments against diversification. Firstly, the pluralization of criminal law and its enforcement can reduce the internal cohesion of the law and produce an inconsistent and contradictory conglomerate (Smith 1994). This goes in turn at the expense of its legitimacy and can cause discrimination. A development of this kind can perhaps be avoided if the adaptations follow the logic of a multicultural criminal law theory. As long as no theory of this kind has however been developed, it is difficult to state which parts of criminal law can or cannot be adjusted, expanded and sharpened. This similarly holds true for all the diversification in the approaches of agencies that enforce criminal law. Pluralization that is not driven by anything but the need of the day and the convictions in fashion at the moment produces a shaky entity that contributes in the last instance towards the disintegration of society. 
		The second disadvantage is that the power factor is overlooked. The multiculturalist ideal creates exaggerated expectations on the part of ethnic minorities. Respect for culture is wonderful, but as long as the minorities are so limited that they only constitute a small percentage of the population and as long as they are less privileged in a socio-economic sense, there is little reason to expect them to be able to make any real demands in this connection. Only very marginal adaptations are to be expected, and they have more to do with the nuisance value of ethnic minority juvenile delinquency than real status and esteem acquired via cogent arguments. 
		The third disadvantage has to do with multiculturalism’s virtually inevitable culture fixation and adherence to ethnic stereotypes. In discussing the issue of ethnic causes of crime, we have referred to the reifying and reductionist use of the concept of culture. Anyone wishing to qualify for special treatment based on ethnic exception has little use for a constructivist and consequently relativist concept of culture. Expert witnesses in the courtroom have little choice but to very concisely present highly complicated ideas and practices to judges who need simple information in order to make a decision (Wiersinga 2002). Use is recurrently made of culturalist opinions and in the Netherlands, cultural anthropologists speak in court who reproduce traditional ethnic criminology studies. The culturalist reporting style is similarly dominant in the work of Justice Department agencies such as the Child Care and Protection Boards, the Probation and After-care Councils and the Forensic Psychiatry Department. (Bovenkerk, Komen and Yesilgoz 2003). It is primarily the enormous pressure Justice Department staff members - street-level bureaucrats, as Lipsky (1980) calls them - are under at work that leads them to turn to the stereotype pattern as recommendation. In the advice and information provided at all the criminal law agencies now and then, in the numerous training courses on interculturalization and against racism and in the curriculum at the police academies, we feel that a static and uniformity-oriented depiction of the various ethnic minorities and their culture is presented, or simplified versions of anthropological interpretations of it. The hybrid and multi-layered culture of the second generation of immigrant youths goes against the norms and values of their own group and is not suitable to be incorporated in any way into the national administration of criminal law. When culture is being invoked it alludes back to the Great Tradition in the country of origin, the official conception in the native country, the holy books, unwritten law. The  Police and Justice Departments turn to today’s religious leaders in the ethnic communities for advice and cooperation in dealing with second-generation crime, even though they are sometimes barely aware of what the day-to-day lives of second-generation youths are like. They consult with the official leaders of the ethnic community, who are often traditional members of the first generation. It has already been noted in American cases where the cultural defence is used that defendants sometimes appear in court in traditional attire. The impression so easily given this way is of a static culture with a high degree of  ‘orientalism’. There is a good chance that the youths’ more Western standpoints, the programme of the women’s emancipation movement or the more progressive groups will not enter the picture in deliberations. The authorities might be aware of this danger, and wonder which other ethnic minority community leaders they ought to approach instead. There is a good chance they will opt for more progressive leaders, whose authority in the community is extremely limited and who mainly use their positions to further their own interests. Anyone claiming to represent the entire ethnic community will present it as being more homogenous and exhibiting greater solidarity than is actually the case. 
The fourth danger is closely linked to the previous ones. Granting a certain exemption for cultural offences generally has the effect of reinforcing the traditional power relations in the ethnic community. The victims of crimes linked to matters of honour or magic are often women or children. Nowadays the most severe criticism of multiculturalism comes from the movement of ethnic minority women (cf. the discussion with Susan Okin in Is multiculturalism bad for women? (1999).
		Fourthly, in the practice of criminal justice there is the risk of defendants using their culture as an excuse for the crime they have committed. Bringing culture into the picture is like building on quicksand. Who has a special culture and who doesn’t? How many people have to share a set of values and norms for it to be a culture? Where is the moral borderline of admissibility? There are also cultures of tax evaders or drug users. Should we accept Mafia murders because they are part of the Mafia culture? Accepting the cultural defence also means any number of other suspects can do the same, me too, flooding the courts with their exemption claims. 

Closing comments




^1	  However, F.Brion, a Belgian professor who reads Dutch, wrote an overview in French with a typically condescending title: Une curiosité néerlandaise, reflecting the politically correct position in Belgium that is noted above (Brion 2003).
^2	  We are unable to substantiate our impression here that the British discourse on social problems tends to focus on disadvantages stemming from social class differentials whereas the French look at individual psychopathology.
^3	  This arithmetic is fraught however with methodological problems, e.g. which ethnic groups are included in the statistics and which are not?
^4	  This might be different for specific immigrant groups such as political refugees. 
